

APPEAL NO. 021990  
FILED SEPTEMBER 23, 2002

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on July 1, 2002. With respect to the single issue before him, the hearing officer determined that the appellant's (claimant) compensable injury of \_\_\_\_\_, does not extend to the lumbar spine. In her appeal, the claimant argues that the hearing officer's determination in that regard is against the great weight of the evidence. In its response to the claimant's appeal, the respondent (self-insured) urges affirmance.

DECISION

Affirmed.

The hearing officer did not err in determining that the claimant's compensable injury of \_\_\_\_\_, does not include an injury to the lumbar spine. That issue presented a question of fact for the hearing officer. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93613, decided August 24, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the hearing officer is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. As the fact finder, the hearing officer resolves the conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence and determines what facts the evidence has established. Garza v. Commercial Ins. Co., 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). In this case, the hearing officer was not persuaded that the claimant sustained her burden of proving that her compensable injury included the compression fractures in the lumbar spine. The hearing officer was acting within his province as the finder of fact in giving more weight to the evidence from the self-insured's required medical examination doctor than to the evidence from the treating doctor, who opined that the claimant's fall at work that was sufficient to have caused her left hip to fracture in two locations and to have caused a meniscal tear in the left knee, also caused the compression fractures in the lumbar spine. Nothing in our review of the record demonstrates that the challenged determination is so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Accordingly, no sound basis exists for us to disturb that determination on appeal. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986). This is so even though another fact finder may well have drawn different inferences from the evidence which would have supported a different result. Salazar v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

The hearing officer's decision and order are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance self-insured is **(SELF-INSURED)** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

**LC  
(ADDRESS)  
(CITY), TEXAS (ZIP CODE).**

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Elaine M. Chaney  
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

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Susan M. Kelley  
Appeals Judge

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Thomas A. Knapp  
Appeals Judge